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Tactical Deception and the
Great Apes: Insight Into the
Question of Theory of Mind
Introduction
Intelligence is divided up into
many specialized mental abilities, not the
least of which is an individual's ability to
attribute independent thought, emotion
and knowledge to another individual
(Knecht 2007). In other words an
individual is able to attribute mental s~ates
to others, recognizing others as individuals
~ith ,their own thoughts, knowledge,
mtentlOns and desires different from their
own (Byrne 1995: 144). This ability is
described as having a "theory of mind"
(Premack & Woodruff 1978: 1),
henceforth referred to as ToM. Most
animals have never shown evidence of
having a ToM and it was once believed to
be an exclusively human trait; a separator
between animal and human cognititive
abilities. However, an increasing amount
of evidence is breaking down this barrier
between humans and animals by
suggesting that some other animals might
have a ToM; non-human primates in
particular show evidence of tactical
deception in which they intentionally
deceive other individuals. This
indicates that they have knowledge of
another individual's point of view
(Premack & Woodruff 1978: 1). Some
anthropologists believe that tactical
deception may be an answer to
whether or not great apes can attribute
mental states to others, or similarly,
have a ToM (Premack & Woodruff
1978: 1). Instances of tactical
deception are difficult to prove as
evidence for a ToM. This is due to the
fact that some actions and reactions
may be explained through social
learning in cause and effect situations
(Byrne & Whiten 1991: 130). This
paper will address the question of
whether or not great apes possess a
ToM. I will give evidence that great
apes do intentionally deceive others,
and that they therefore have some
abilities of mental-state attribution.
Tactical Deception: Intentional
Trickery or a Learned Reward
System?
Due to the abstract nature of
the subject, it is impossible to
effectively communicate ToM to a
great ape. As a result, anthropologists
and primatologists must rely on
observations of ape behaviour in order
to determine their ability to attribute
mental states to others. However,
most ape interactions offer little
insight into the thoughts of the ape and
can often be interpreted in several
ways (Tomasello & Call 1997: 329,
340; Byrne & Whiten 1992: 611).
Consequently, some anthropologists
now focus on rare instances of tactical
deception in an attempt to prove
mental attribution by great apes.
TOTEM vollS 2006-2007
Copyright © 2007 TOTEM: The UWO Journal of Anthropology
Kirkpatrick: Tactical Deception and the Great Apes
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
Tactical deception is defined as "acts from
the normal repertoire of [an] agent,
deployed such that another individual is
likely to misinterpret what acts signify, to
the advantage of the agent" (Byrne &
Whiten 1991: 127) When considering
tactical deception as potential evidence for
a ToM there are four behavioural
categories that may help to demonstrate
the ape's thought process: initial deceit,
counterdeception, deception in play, and
righteous indignation.
Initial Deceit
Initial deceit is one of the most
difficult forms of deception to prove as
demonstrative of a ToM since it can often
be explained through cause and effect, and
trial and error learning (Byrne 1995: 133;
Tomasello & Call 1997: 311, 320, 322;
Whiten 1997: 147). This form of deceit is
usually seen in the form of concealment or
hiding of oneself, an action, an object or
an emotion or through distraction (Whiten
1997: 162; Whiten & Byrne 1988: 212).
A well-known example involves a
chimpanzee that was approached from
behind by an audibly aggressive rival
(deWaal 1986: 233; Byrne & Whiten
1991: 134). Here, the chimpanzee
manipulated his lips several times before
ridding itself of its fear grin and only after
he had done so, he turned around to brave
the challenger, concealing his fearful
expression. Other observations of
deception recorded by deWaal (1986)
involved several instances in which a
subordinate male courted a female by
displaying his penile erection. Whenever
a dominant male unexpectedly appeared,
the aroused subordinate would hide his
erection from the view of the approaching
chimpanzee (deWaal 1986: 233; Whiten
1993: 377; Whiten & Byrne 1988: 215-
216). The chimpanzee dropped his arm,
always leaving his hand to dangle between
the dominant male and his erection.
This was done in order to avoid a
violent confrontation, which would
have been inevitable had the dominant
been aware of the subordinate's
actions. There are also records of apes
diverting another individual's attentiqn
from themselves or from food (Menzel
1974: 134-135; Byrne & Whiten 1991:
130-131; Byrne 1995: 132). In order to
achieve this goal of distraction, the
great apes usually use tactics that
involve feigning interest in other
things, both real and imaginary. There
are also instances in which apes have
been known to inhibit their excitement
or behaviour upon the discovery of
food in order to keep the findings from
being taken by other apes (Byrne
1995: 134; Whiten & Byrne 1988:
220).
Counterdeception
Another potential method for
proving a ToM through tactical
deception is through the recognition of
deception by apes and actions taken to
reduce the losses suffered from being
deceived (Byrne & Whiten 1991: 129).
This struggle between deception and
counterdeception was seen in an
experiment on spatial knowledge
conducted by the American
psychologist, Menzel, in 1974. In the
experiment, food was hidden and only
one individual, named Belle, in a
group of chimpanzees was informed of
the location (Menzel 1974: 134-135;
Byrne & Whiten 1991:130-131; Byrne
1995: 132). Belle was eager to lead
the group to the food but when one
chimpanzee, named Rock, began to
refuse to share the food, Belle changed
her behaviour (Menzel 1974: 134-135;
Byrne & Whiten 1991: 130-131;
Byrne 1995: 132). She began to sit on
TOTEM vol 15 2006-2007
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the food until Rock was far away, then she
would uncover it quickly and eat it
(Menzel 1974: 134-135; Byrne & Whiten
1991: 130-131; Byrne 1995: 132). Rock
figured this out though and began to push
her out of the way and take the food from
under her (Menzel 1974: 134-135; Byrne
& Whiten 1991: 130-131; Byrne 1995:
132). Belle then sat farther and farther
away waiting for Rock to look away
before she moved towards the food
(Menzel 1974: 134-135; Byrne & Whiten
1991: 130-131; Byrne 1995: 132). In an
attempt to speed the process up, Rock
looked away until Belle began to run for
the food. On several occasions he would
even walk away, acting disinterested, and
then suddenly spin around and run towards
Belle just as she uncovered the food
(Menzel 1974: 134-135; Byrne & Whiten
1991: 130-131; Byrne 1995: 132).
A similar strategy was seen in an
experiment involving two chimpanzees.
In this experiment, one chimpanzee
inhibited its excitement about the
unlocking of a food box in an attempt to
fool the other chimpanzee into thinking
that nothing had happened (Byrne 1995:
134; Whiten & Byrne 1988: 220). The
deceptive chimpanzee continued this act
until the second chimpanzee was out of
sight (Byrne 1995: 134). However, the
second chimpanzee had heard the sound of
the box unlocking and it hid behind a tree,
where it watched the first chimpanzee
(Byrne 1995: 134). When the deceptive
chimpanzee went to retrieve the food the
other chimpanzee ran out from his hiding
place and stole it (Byrne 1995: 134).
Deception in Play
Deception in play requires the
player to "[hold] simultaneous
representations of two conflicting sets of
knowledge or belief' (Byrne 1995: 138).
There are many recorded examples of
great apes pretending both with and
without props. A wild mountain
gorilla, named Maggie, was seen
pulling up a bundle of soft moss,
building a nest and sitting to nurse it as
if it were an infant (Byrne 1995: 139).
A chimpanzee named Viki was
observed while pretending to drag an
imaginary pull-toy and pretending to
struggle to free it when she got it
caught on a real object (Byrne 1995:
138-139; Parker & McKinney 1999:
129). Viki tried many strategies to
free the pull-toy and showed
frustration throughout her efforts
(Byrne 1995: 138-139). Kanzi, a
bonobo trained to communicate with
keyboard symbols, played with a toy
dog and toy gorilla (Savage-
Rumbaugh et al. 1998: 60). He often
pretended that the toys were biting him
and he pulled back and shook his
finger in reaction to the imaginary bite
(Savage- Rumbaugh et al. 1998: 60).
Kanzi also masqueraded in a monster
mask and tried to frighten people. On
occasion, he even asked the trainer to
wear the mask and pretend to scare
him back (Savage-Rumbaugh et al.
1998: 60). In reaction to the trainer
chasing him with the mask on, Kanzi
screamed as though he was afraid of
him. However, when the trainer
stopped to see if he was really afraid
Kanzi "[seemed] puzzled as to why
[the trainer] has stopped and [gave] no
evidence of real fear at all" (Savage-
Rumbaugh et al. 1998: 60).
Righteous Indignation
If great apes do have a ToM it
seems logical that they would show a
"reaction specific to understanding that
[they have] been deceived", otherwise
known as showing righteous
indignation (Byrne 1995: 131). On
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one occasion, a Dutch developmental
psychologist, named Plooij, used a tactic
that he had seen chimpanzees use. He
looked into the distance to divert a young
chimpanzee's attention and she followed
the gaze, wandering off in that direction
(Byrne & Whiten 1991: 129; Whiten
1993: 375; Byrne 1995: 131). Upon
realising that there was nothing of
importance to look at, the chimpanzee
returned, hit Plooij on the head and
appeared to ignore him for the rest of the
day (Byrne & Whiten 1991: 129; Whiten
1993: 375; Byrne 1995: 131). While this
instance certainly gives a clear example of
righteous indignation, it is not the only
possible explanation for this behaviour. It
must be considered that the two events
may have been entirely unrelated (Byrne
& Whiten 1991: 129).
In order to test for righteous
indignation, an experiment was conducted
involving the serving of a juice treat to a
chimpanzee (Whiten 1993: 376;
Tomasello & Call 1997: 320). One person
offering the juice dropped the cup
'accidentally', then a second person
offering the juice 'deliberately' poured the
contents of the cup onto the floor, thereby
making the offering of the juice a
deception (Whiten 1993: 376; Tomasello
& Call 1997: 320). The chimpanzee was
then allowed to choose the person to serve
the next cup of juice and the chimpanzee
consistently chose the person who had
spilled the juice 'accidentally' (Whiten
1993: 376; Tomasello & Call 1997: 320).
This experiment indicates that the
chimpanzee is able to differentiate
between intentional and unintentional
actions (Whiten 1993: 376; Tomasello &
Call 1997: 320). It also shows that the
chimpanzee attributes these actions to the
personality of the people involved and
prefers the person that did not deceive
him.
Discussion
Whiten and Byrne (1988)
interpreted the concealment of the fear
grin as the chimpanzee's
understanding that the rival would
react violently upon seeing the fear
grin. Byrne and Whiten (1991) later
expressed doubts about the validity of
this observation as evidence of a ToM
due to the fact that the deceit may not
have been proof of mental attribution.
Instead, they concluded that the ape
might have learned the behavioural
patterns of the rival ape in relation to
its own actions (Byrne & Whiten
1991: 134; Cheney & Seyfarth 1990:
217; Seyfarth & Cheney 1996: 341;
Tomesello & Call 1997: 269). In other
words, the chimpanzee may not have
necessarily considered the rival's
mental state, but instead intended to
directly alter its behaviour.
The case of the concealed
penile erection may also be argued to
be learned behaviour: However, it
seems unlikely that the subordinate
would notice a connection between the
position of his hand and the dominant
ape's behaviour. It is more likely that
the chimpanzee understood that the
erection must be seen in order for the
competitor to react (Whiten 1993:
378). It is also possible that the
chimpanzee made judgements about
what the competitor might or might
not notice (Whiten 1993: 378). This
may also be interpreted as a
demonstration of the chimpanzee's
ability to make the connection between
vision and knowledge (Whiten 1993:
378). Since the chimpanzee could
accurately compute the dominant
chimpanzee's line of sight it is possible
that he knows that sight is a precursor
to knowledge, emotion and reaction
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(Whiten 1993: 378). If an ape believes
and understands that other individuals
have different lines of sight, it is possible
that by extension, apes understand that
other individuals also have different
knowledge and independent thought
processes (Whiten 1993: 378). In both the
cases of the concealment of the fear grin
and the penile erection, the evidence
suggests that apes might understand that
the individual being deceived is ignorant
to the knowledge that is available to the
deceiver (Whiten 1997: 160). In this
sense, the apes can separate their own
thoughts from those of their target of
deception.
The counterdeceptive tactics
discussed earlier are important because of
their use of novel behaviour (Byrne 1995:
133). Both spinning around in mid-step
and hiding behind trees are unusual
behaviours for great apes and so they
cannot be accounted for by social learning
in cause and effect situations (Byrne &
Whiten 1991: 131; Byrne 1995: 133).
Although spinning around in midstep is
novel behaviour, it is still unknown if
Rock was able to predict Belle's thought
process and anticipate her behaviour
(Byrne & Whiten 1991: 131; Byrne 1995:
133) or if he had simply learned her
behaviour through repetition (Tomasello
& Call 1997: 272). In the case of the ape
that hid behind the tree, there was no
repetition from which the suspicious
chimpanzee could learn the deceptive
chimpanzee's behaviour (Whiten & Byrne
1988: 220; Byrne & Whiten 1991:
131,1992: 624; Byrne 1995: 133). It is
more likely that the hiding ape had
understood the other ape's intent to
deceive and taken actions to maximize its
own reward.
The use of deception in play is
probably the most complex category of
tactical deception. Leslie (1987) argued
that human children first exhibit the
development of a ToM when they are
also able to react accordingly to
pretend happenings. He proposed that
there is an underlying foundation
shared between pretence and mind
attribution (Leslie 1987: 423). This is
because, while pretending, the child is
attributing a mental state to whomever
or whatever it might be playing with
(Parker & McKinney 1999: 141).
Playing apes, therefore, know the
reality of the situation but also either
believe that the individual present in
the game believes their pretence, or
that the individual understands both
the reality and the pretence, but plays
along anyway (Parker & McKinney
1999: 141). In both cases, the ape
believes that an individual thinks
something external to his/her own set
of knowledge.
Byrne and Whiten (1991)
suggested that the use of props in
pretence may be even more complex
than pretence without a prop because
of interference from perception of the
real nature of the prop. According to
Leslie (1987), acts of play using props
show that the pretend representation is
derived from a primary one and
therefore the ape can suspend primary
representations and attribute a
personality to an inanimate object.
This may also apply to the use of the
self as a prop as demonstrated in the
case of Kanzi scaring people with a
mask. In this example, Kanzi actually
suspends his own personality and takes
on an alternate persona. This shows
that Kanzi is aware that individuals are
not all alike; they do not act alike and
perhaps they also do not think alike.
This conclusion may also be reached
when addressing the
intentional/unintentional spill test for
TOTEM vol 15 2006-2007
Copyright © 2007 TOTEM: The UWO Journal of Anthropology
Kirkpatrick: Tactical Deception and the Great Apes
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
righteous indignation. In this test the
chimpanzee was able to differentiate
between a person that spilled the juice
deliberately and a person that had spilled it
accidentally. Based on this alone, the
chimpanzee attributed intention and
demeanor to the juice spillers and
consistently chose the one that spilled the
juice accidentally to serve the next cup.
Since the chimpanzee was able to
differentiate between intentional and
unintentional actions, the chimpanzee
must know that it is necessary for the
person to plan, or to think about,
intentional actions or at least have their
own motivations and desires. The
chimpanzee must therefore be aware that
others think and have different intentions,
knowledge and emotions not shared with
them.
Summary and Conclusions
Tactical deception in great apes is
difficult to interpret due to the problem of
intentionality (Tomasello & Call 1997:
340-341). However, there is a growing
number of cases, like those presented in
this paper, that are not easily explained
without a ToM, including great apes using
uncharacteristic or novel behaviour to
counterdeceive (Byrne 1995: 133), apes
releasing primary representations of
themselves, others or objects during play
(Leslie 1987: 417), and righteous
indignation after being targeted by
deception (Whiten 1993: 375; Byrne 1995:
131). These are all strong arguments for a
ToM in great apes with few alternative
explanations. It follows that, by using the
most parsimonious explanation, we may
choose to accept the hypothesis of a theory
of mind in great apes until it is found to be
incorrect.
Unfortunately, there is not and may
never be, solid indisputable evidence for a
ToM in great apes. Great ape social
interactions are very complex and it is
near impossible to understand an ape's
thoughts by mere behavioural
observations (Whiten 1997: 157, 159).
In spite of this difficulty, there are
other areas of investigation that might
help solve the question of ToM in
great apes such as gaze following, self
recognition, group relationship
dynamics, linguistics and recognition
of others. Further study and
experimentation in these topics should
be pursued to gain more insight into
theory of mind in great apes.
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